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I. INTRODUCTION
More than twenty-five years have elapsed since the first cause of action for
a so-called "wrongful life" was brought in the Illinois case of Zepeda v.
Zepeda.' While Zepeda dealt with a rather simple claim by an otherwise
healthy infant against his biological father for having "caused" the infant to
suffer his "wrongful life" as an "adulterine bastard,"2 the wrongful life claim
was soon introduced into far more complex and tragic contexts.
By far the most common of these has been in the area of genetic counseling
for would-be parents and parents-to-be. The frequently touted marvels of mod-
ern technology have certainly incfeased the potential for informed decisionmak-
ing by prospective parents with regard to possible congenital and genetic defects
in their offspring. As one presidential commission has noted:
The rapid advances now occurring in genetic screening techniques and the in-
creased resources devoted to genetic counseling give Americans new opportunities to
understand their biological heritage and to make their health care and reproductive
plans accordingly ...
...The demand for such counseling has grown dramatically in the past decades and
promises to become increasingly important as new screening tests are developed.'
With the new technology and its ability to provide some measure of assurance
to prospective parents come the responsibility and duty of professionals to em-
ploy that technology correctly. When the duty to inform parents of potential
genetic or congenital hazards faced by their offspring is breached, the result can
be the birth of an impaired infant-one who might otherwise have been spared
his suffering. This then is the assertion common to all wrongful life
claims-that another's negligence has resulted in the birth of a child so im-
paired that it would have been better for that child never to have been born. 4
While the wrongful life cause of action has turned up in a variety of fac-
tual situations, it has met with virtually no success on either the judicial5 or the
1. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
2. For those not familiar with the term, "[an adulterine bastard, as contrasted to an ordinary bastard, is a
child born to parents one or both of whom is married to another person not a biologicial parent of the child. An
ordinary bastard is simply an illegitimate child born to two unmarried parents." H. BUTZEL, GENFrICS IN THE
COURTS 1 (1987).
3. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH. SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS 1, 4 (1983).
4. Some commentators have tried to avoid the starkness of this assertion by framing the claim for wrongful
life in other terms, such as a failure to provide the impaired child's parents with information necessary to give
"informed consent" to the continuation of the pregnancy.
5. The following jurisdictions have rejected a common law cause of action for wrongful life: Alabama,
Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Arizona, Walker v. Mart, No. CV-89-0065-CQ (Ariz. Apr. 12,
1990) (1909 WL 250); Colorado, Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988); Delaware, Garrison v.
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legislative 6 level, especially when compared to the closely related claim of
"wrongful birth," which emerged at about the same time. At present, a cause
of action for wrongful life has been clearly recognized in only three states.8
This Note wilt examine the wrongful life tort and its reception by the
courts over the past twenty-five years. Section II begins by looking at the tort
itself: the common core assertion and traditional negligence elements, as well as
various fact patterns. Section III follows with a brief historical look at the tort,
beginning with its origins in bastardy cases and proceeding through its limited
acceptance in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories9 and related cases.
The rationales used by the courts in refusing to recognize the wrongful life
cause of action will be examined in Section IV. The earliest rationales used by
the courts are presented first: unascertainability of damages; conflicts over the
abortion issue; and concerns about "opening the floodgates" of the court system
Medical Center of Del. Inc., No. 193, 1988 (Sup. Ct. Del. Dec. 12, 1989) (1989 WL 160433); Florida, Moores v.
Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Idaho, Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984);
Illinois, Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 II1. 2d 230, 512 N.E.2d 691 (1987); Kansas, Bruggeman v.
Schimke, 239 Kan. 245, 718 P.2d 635 (1986); Kentucky, Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983) (dictum);
Massachusetts, Viccaro v. Milunsky, 406 Mass. 777, 551 N.E.2d 8 (Mar. 1, 1990) (1990 WL 18199); Michigan,
Proffitt v. Bartolo, 162 Mich. App. 35, 412 N.W.2d 232 (1987); Missouri, Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741
(Mo. 1988); New Hampshire, Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 513 A.2d 341 (1986); New York, Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); North Carolina, Azzolino v. Dingfelder,
315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986); Pennsylvania, Ellis v. Sherman, 512 Pa.
14, 515 A.2d 1327 (1986); South Carolina, Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980) (construing
South Carolina law); Texas, Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); West Virginia, James G. v. Caserta,
332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Wisconsin, Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372
(1975).
6. The following jurisdictions have enacted statutes prohibiting a cause of action for wrongful life: Indiana,
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-11 (Burns Supp. 1989); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (Supp. 1989);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (West 1990); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130-1 (Vernon Supp.
1990); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (Supp. 1989); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-1
(1987); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (1987, Supp. 1989).
7. For the distinction between wrongful life torts and wrongful birth torts, see infra note 16 and accompa-
nying text.
8. The following states have recognized the wrongful life cause of action: California, Turpin v. Sortini, 31
Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982); New Jersey, Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755
(1984); Washington, Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983). The status of wrong-
ful life claims is unclear in two other states at this time. In dicta, the Supreme Court of Louisiana has determined
that a physician has a duty to an unconceived child to warn the prospective parents and help them avoid concep-
tion when that physician knows or should know of the existence of an unreasonable risk that the child would be
born with a birth defect. Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1157 (La. 1988).
In addition, an Indiana appellate court has recently recognized a wrongful life cause of action when the
allegedly negligent acts of the defendant occurred prior to the plaintiff child's conception. See Cowe v. Forum
Group, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 962 (Ind. App. 1989). In Cowe, the court noted that the language of a state statute
prohibited a wrongful life cause of action only if based on the assertion that but for another party's negligence the
plaintiff would have been aborted. Id. (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-11 (Burns Supp. 1989)). Such a statute
was held not to apply to the case at hand, because the plaintiff was claiming not that he should have been aborted,
but rather that he should never have been conceived. Id. at 965.
A similar problem could arise in most of the other states that have enacted "no wrongful life" statutes,
because they too speak only in terms of the abortion issue. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (Supp.
1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (West 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-11-24 (1987, Supp. 1989). The South Dakota statute precludes a wrongful life cause of action for pre-
conception acts as well as for those that prevented the infant's parents from obtaining an abortion. S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 21-55-1 (1987). Although the Missouri statute speaks only to the abortion issue, a wrongful life cause of
action had already been rejected by the state's common law. Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988).
9. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
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to voluminous litigation. These rationales have generally been rejected by later
courts, either because the law and policies supporting them have changed (as
with the abortion issue), or because the rationales were merely indirect means
of addressing what has since emerged as the courts' central and overriding con-
cern: the sanctity of human life and its protection.
This "sanctity of life" rationale is then examined. It exists at two levels:
the surface level, where the preference of courts for continued existence regard-
less of defects reflects a basic belief that nonexistence is never a valid alterna-
tive to an impaired existence; and a deeper level, where this deep-seated per-
sonal preference takes the form of a "logico-legal difficulty"10 with comparing
impaired existence to nonexistence. 1' Finally, Section V will consider a means
of analyzing the difficult and emotional issues involved in wrongful life disputes,
one that will lead to logically consistent, even though at times emotionally un-
satisfying, results.
II. ANATOMY OF THE TORT
Although all wrongful life claims share a common core assertion, they defy
easy characterization because of the many situations in which they arise and
because of the varying circumstances of wrongful life plaintiffs. Despite this
variety, it is easy to describe the structure of the tort in terms of its basic tort
elements. Most of these elements-duty, breach, and causation-vary compara-
tively little from case to case. The final element, injury (with its resulting dam-
ages), is often the crucial one in courts' analyses, leading to great confusion and
a seeming inequity of results. It is on this element of proof that most wrongful
life claims fail.
A. General Definition
While the wrongful life tort is often viewed as controversial and innovative,
it actually follows a very traditional negligence pattern, asserting the elements
of duty, breach, causation, and injury. 2 In general, the wrongful life claim is
made by or on behalf of an "impaired" child who asserts that he would have
been spared his impaired existence, either through his parents' decision not to
conceive or through a timely abortion, were it not for the negligent' 3 acts or
omissions of the defendant.' 4 The infant plaintiff thus claims "not that he
should have been born without defects but that he should not have been born at
10. Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 484, 223 N.E.2d 343, 345, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 888 (1966) (citing
Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life", I ISRAEL L. REV. 513 (1966)).
II. Ironically, even the few courts that have recognized a valid cause of action for wrongful life have failed
to leap this hurdle. See, e.g., Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983); Procanik v.
Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984); Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337
(1982); see also notes 148-70 and accompanying text.
12. Trotzig, The Defective Child and the Actions for Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth, 14 FAM. L.Q. 15,
21 (1980-81).
13. But see Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Il. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
(1964) (fraud, rather than negligence, as the basis for a wrongful life claim; see infra notes 67-69 and accompany-
ing text).
14. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967).
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all" and that "but for the negligence of defendants, he would not have been
born to suffer." 15
B. The Parties
It is important to note that wrongful life suits are brought by or on behalf
of the impaired infant himself. This distinguishes claims for wrongful life from
those for "wrongful birth," which are brought instead by the parents of the
impaired child for the emotional and financial damages that they have suffered
as a result of the birth.16 The two suits are usually brought together, although
factors such as the parents' failure to meet the statute of limitations in filing
their suit may result in one suit being brought without the other.17
Defendants in wrongful life suits are usually medical professionals or orga-
nizations to which the infant plaintiff's parents turned for guidance or other
services in connection with the pregnancy. 8
C. Elements of Negligence
1. Duty and Breach
A wrongful life claim requires a relationship between the defendant and
the infant plaintiff's family that has created some duty on the part of the de-
fendant toward the plaintiff and his parents. The exact relationship between the
parties can vary, however. Many cases involve a physician who has provided
negligent services to the impaired child's parents, either before or after concep-
tion of the child.' 9 This negligence could involve such errors as "failing to take
a genetic history of a couple or incorrectly informing a couple of their chances
for giving birth to a defective child . . . or fail[ing] to inform them of possible
tests that can be used to determine whether their child will be born with de-
fects." 20 In other cases, the physician or other medical specialist has misdiag-
nosed a genetic condition in older siblings of the impaired child, thus preventing
the parents from recognizing the possibility of the same condition occurring in
the impaired child.21 Often the defendant is a laboratory providing genetic
15. Id.
16. Several courts have recognized a claim for "wrongful birth" brought by the parents of an impaired
child, despite their rejection of the impaired child's own claim for wrongful life. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80
N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). In addition, courts have recognized claims for "wrongful conception" or "wrongful
pregnancy" by parents of a healthy, but unplanned or unwanted, infant. These claims ask for damages in the
amount of either the costs of the pregnancy alone, or the costs of raising the child to majority. For more on the
wrongful birth and wrongful conception torts, see Collins, An Overview and Analysis: Prenatal Torts, Preconcep-
tion Torts. Wrongful Life. Wrongful Death, and Wrongful Birth: Time For a New Framework, 22 J. FAM. L. 677,
690-700 (1983-84).
17. See, e.g., Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984).
18. For some exceptions to this, see Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 11. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964) (suit against the biological father); Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 962
(Ind. App. 1989) (suit against the owner of a private nursing home); Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223
N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966) (suit against the State through its mental hospital).
19. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
20. Trotzig, supra note 12, at 22.
21. See. e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
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screening or genetic counseling services to the parents, either before or after
conception has taken place.22 Finally, the defendant may be a physician who
has performed either an unsuccessful sterilization procedure or an unsuccessful
abortion for the parents."
With few exceptions,24 modern courts have had little trouble accepting the
elements of duty and breach in wrongful life suits. This would not always have
been true, however. As one commentator has noted, "Courts traditionally have
been reluctant to find that a duty can be owed to someone who has not been
born or conceived at the time of the defendant's allegedly negligent act."'25 It
was only in the case of Bonbrest v. Kotz, 26 decided in 1946, that the long-held
common law view that "children were unable to recover for prenatal injuries
because a duty could not be owed to someone as yet unborn" 27 was overturned.
For the first time an unborn child, as long as it was viable at the time of injury
and was subsequently born alive, could maintain a valid-cause of action for
prenatal injuries.2 8
This view has since expanded in most jurisdictions to include not only inju-
ries sustained after the fetus has become viable, but also those injuries received
after conception but before viability.29 Many courts have gone even further and
"permit[ted] an infant, born alive, to bring an action for injuries arising out of
preconception negligent conduct"30 by stressing the foreseeability of the harm to
the fetus. 31 Thus, legal duties to an infant have been found to exist before birth,
before viability, and even before conception. 2
The "informed consent" doctrine often provides the basis for a claim of
duty in wrongful life suits.33 If a defendant "knows or should know of facts that
indicate an increased likelihood of a deformity in a child, he ought to disclose
that information to the parents to permit them to choose intelligently whether
to conceive a child or, if one is conceived, whether to terminate the preg-
nancy."1 4 This duty can then be extended to the child in one of two ways, either
by recognizing a separate duty to the child that is similar to the one owed to the
parents,35 or by identifying the child as a foreseeable third-party victim of the
breached duty owed to the parents (i.e., a "derivative" duty).36 Whether by
22. See, e.g., Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
23. See, e.g., Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988).
24. See, e.g., Albala v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269, 429 N.E.2d 786, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981).
25. Note, Park v. Chessin. The Continuing Judicial Development of the Theory of "Wrongful Life", 4 AM.
J. L. & MED. 211, 219 (1978-79).
26. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
27. Note, supra note 25, at 219.
28. Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal
Testing, 33 S.C.L. REv. 713, 731 (1981-82).
29. Id. at 731.
30. Id. at 732 (quoting Bergstresser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1978)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Comment, "Wrongful Life" The Right Not to be Born, 54 TUL L. REv. 480, 488 (1979-80).
34. Id. at 488-89.
35. See, e.g., Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1157-58 (La. 1988). For the problems associ-
ated with this view and a satisfactory rebuttal, see Comment, supra note 33, at 489-90.
36. Comment, supra note 33, at 490.
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direct or derivative approaches, however, courts have been willing to recognize a
duty to the unborn (and often even unconceived) child.
2. Causation
The element of causation has not presented a problem in wrongful life suits
except where courts, and even plaintiffs, 7 have misunderstood what the claim
actually asserts.3 8 For example, the majority in Ellis v. Sherman39 felt that
"[t]he condition about which the plaintiff complains, a diseased life, was in-
flicted upon the plaintiff not by any person, but by the plaintiff's genetic consti-
tution. ''40 The court then concluded that there could be no legal injury to the
infant because "the condition was caused not by another, but by natural
processes. 41
As the Ellis dissent pointed out, however, "[t]he child in this case . . . is
not claiming that the doctors 'caused his disease'. '42 Rather, the child was
claiming that the defendant's "negligence-his failure to adequately inform the
parents of the risk-has caused the birth of the deformed child. The child ar-
gues that but for the inadequate advice, it would not have been born to experi-
ence the pain and suffering attributable to the deformity." 43
Thus, whether or not a court has found causation between the defendant's
negligence and the child's "condition" has depended to a large degree on what
the court considered the condition to be. As one commentator has noted:
If one accepts the idea that the damage the child is suing for is not its deformity,
but rather its birth, then proximate cause presents little obstacle to the child's recov-
ery. . . . To complete the chain of causation, the child would then have to show that
had his parents been so informed, they would have prevented his birth.44
3. Injury
Injury has undoubtedly been the most troublesome element of a wrongful
life suit for the courts.45 All wrongful life claims assert an impaired life as the
injury; thus, the child asserts that the "net burden" of his life-the burdens of
his impairment mitigated by the benefits he has enjoyed as a result of his exis-
tence-is an injury caused by the defendant's negligence. 46 However, the degree
of actual impairment has varied greatly from case to case. Some cases have
involved otherwise healthy infants whose only impairment has been being born
37. See. e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal, 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
38. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
39. 512 Pa. 14, 515 A.2d 1327 (1986).
40. Id. at 19, 515 A.2d at 1329.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 22, 515 A.2d at 1330 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
43. Comment, supra note 33, at 485.
44. Id. at 491. For a discussion of the standard to be used in determining whether the parents would have
chosen to prevent the birth, see id. at 491-92.
45. Id. at 492.




in a state of illegitimacy.47 Others have involved children born with such defects
as blindness,48 deafness,49 or Down's Syndrome,50 who can expect a relatively
normal and functional life span. Finally, there are cases of children with se-
verely debilitating conditions such as Tay-Sachs disease,5' polycystic kidney dis-
ease,52 or cystic fibrosis, 53 who can expect at best a greatly shortened life span
filled with often intense pain and suffering.
Courts have had great difficulty in viewing any of these impaired lives as
an "injury" to a child.54 In the courts' approach, "life-whether experienced
with or without a major physical handicap--is more precious than non-life, ' 55
and thus a child can never be injured, as a matter of law, by being born.58 The
courts therefore set up a nonrebuttable presumption in favor of life, with no
opportunity for the trier of fact to judge each situation for itself and to make
appropriate decisions. This is all done under the guise of logical and legal prin-
ciples. What is most important to recognize in this context, however, is that
"[iln ruling in this fashion, courts are not announcing purely rational conclu-
sions derived from legal principles but are instead proclaiming their personal
views on certain value-laden 'facts' .
4. Damages
The traditional goal of the law in awarding damages in a negligence action
is to compensate the plaintiff for his injury.58 While most injuries suffered in
wrongful life cases are nonpecuniary in nature, the compensatory goal can still
exist: "[Ihe real purpose in such cases is to establish and vindicate a right that
is deemed important, even though not pecuniary in its immediate
consequence."59
Damages are normally measured by "comparing the condition plaintiff
would have been in, had the defendant[] not been negligent, with plaintiff's
impaired condition as a result of the negligence."8 0 In wrongful life claims,
then, the child usually asserts as "general" damages the pain and suffering he
will endure during his lifetime as a result of the defect, but presumably less the
47. See, e.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 I11. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
(1964).
48. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
49. See. e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
50. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
51. See, e.g., Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
52. See, e.g., Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), mgdified sub noma. Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
53. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981).
54. See infra notes 151-73 and accompanying text.
55. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 429, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979).
56. See id. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12.
57. Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 618, 650 (1979) (emphasis added).
For a discussion of this view, see infra notes 174-86 and accompanying text.
58. D. DoBBs, REMEDIES § 3.1, at 135 (1973).
59. Id. at 136. However, punitive damages have also been claimed. See, e.g., Curlender v. Bio-Science
Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811. 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
60. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967).
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benefits he will derive from his existence, if any."" This "net burden" is then
measured not against the value of a "normal" life, but against the nullity of
nonexistence. 62
Plaintiffs in wrongful life suits also frequently request "special" damages to
cover the costs of medical care, special educational or training needs, and spe-
cialized equipment.3 These special damages may be sought either as to ex-
penses that will arise after the child has reached majority or as to all expenses
incurred, during both minority and majority. The choice depends largely on
whether the costs incurred during the child's minority are already being sought
by the child's parents in a separate suit.6 4
III. A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The twenty-five year history of the wrongful life tort has largely been one
of rejection, with occasional periods of limited acceptance. This Section will
look at the major turning points in the development of the tort, as well as at the
major cases that have helped influence the way in which courts view wrongful
life claims today.
A. The Earliest Cases
The first two cases that contained a claim for wrongful life were similar in
that the "impairment" allegedly suffered by the plaintiff infants was not a phys-
ical disease or handicap, but the social stigma of illegitimacy. While some com-
mentators have insisted that these cases do not really involve "wrongful life"
claims,65 they have been included here because of the impact they had on what
is usually considered to be the first "true" wrongful life case, Gleitman v.
Cosgrove.66
The infant plaintiff in Zepeda v. Zepeda67 brought suit through his mother
against his biological father, who had allegedly "induced the plaintiff's mother
to have sexual relations by promising to marry her; this promise was not kept
and could not be kept because, unbeknown to the mother, the defendant was
already married." ' Thus, the basis of the claim was not negligence, but fraud.
The infant sought general damages to compensate "for the deprivation of his
right to be a legitimate child, to have a normal home, to have a legal father, to
inherit from his father, to inherit from his paternal ancestors and for being
stigmatized as a bastard."6 9
61. For a brief discussion of the benefit rule, see infra note 197 and accompanying text.
62. See Note, supra note 25, at 226.
63. 7 SHEPARD'S CAUSES OF ACTION 628 (1988).
64. Generally, parents have brought their own wrongful birth actions to recover expenses of the child during
minority, unless they have been precluded by the statute of limitations.
65. See, e.g., Trotzig, supra note 12.
66. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
67. 41 1. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
68. Id. at 245, 190 N.E.2d at 851.
69. Id. at 246, 190 N.E.2d at 851.
[Vol. 51:473
WRONGFUL LIFE
The infant was mistaken, however, in asserting that he had been deprived
by his father's fraudulent act of having a normal-and "legitimate"-life. The
father's inducement of sexual relations did not take away the status of normalcy
and legitimacy from a plaintiff who already possessed them; rather, these were
conditions which, because of the father's already-married status, could not pos-
sibly have come about for this particular infant. 0 The proper measure of dam-
ages would thus have been, according to the wrongful life claim asserted by
plaintiff, not the difference between a normal, legitimate life and the life he led
as an illegitimate child, but rather the difference between total nonexistence
and his life as an illegitimate child.
The court acknowledged that the defendant father had committed a tor-
tious act,7 1 and that the infant plaintiff had undoubtedly suffered an injury by
being born illegitimate.7 2 Nevertheless, the court upheld a lower court's dismis-
sal of the suit for a failure to state a cause of action. The court based its deci-
sion squarely on policy grounds. It feared that recognition of the new tort would
lead not only to similar suits filed by the hundreds of thousands of illegitimately
born children in the state, but could extend as well to suits by other "impaired
status" groups who might claim to have suffered "injuries" by their birth into
racial minority, socio-economically deprived, or even too-large families. Noting
that "[the legal implications of such a tort are vast, [and that] the social im-
pact could be staggering,"7 3 the court left it to the legislature to handle the
problem.7 4
The Zepeda decision was followed three years later by Williams v. State,7 5
another suit involving illegitimacy. The infant plaintiff's mother had been a pa-
tient in a mental institution run by the state of New York. Because of the insti-
tution's alleged negligence in protecting the safety of the mother, a sexual as-
sault had occurred that resulted in the conception and subsequent birth of the
plaintiff. Because of her birth to an unmarried and "mentally deficient" mother,
the plaintiff claimed damage in being "deprived of property rights; deprived of
a normal childhood and home life; deprived of proper parental care, support,
and rearing; [and] caused to bear the stigma of illegitimacy. 71 8
Once again, however, a plaintiff had mistaken the nature of the injury ac-
tually suffered. As pointed out by Judge Keating in a concurring opinion, the
plaintiff's comparison of her current position and a "normal and legitimate" life
was unwarranted, because "had the State acted responsibly, she would not have
been born legitimately-she would not have been born at all."7 7
70. In analyzing these actions, it is necessary to avoid conceptualizing the plaintiff before birth as a disem-
bodied "baby spirit" waiting in limbo for the next available chance to be born. Each conception results in the
creation of a new person-if an unborn plaintiff is terminated due to impairment, etc., he will not get another
chance at a "normal" or healthy body.
71. Zepeda, 41 I1. App. 2d at 259, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
72. Id. at 258, 190 N.E.2d at 857.
73. Id. at 259, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
74. Id. at 262-63, 190 N.E.2d at 859.
75. 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
76. Id. at 482, 223 N.E.2d at 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
77. Id. at 485, 223 N.E.2d at 345, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 888 (Keating, J., concurring).
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The court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim, citing first its
reluctance to "invent a brand new ground for suit." ' Moreover, the court re-
fused to recognize illegitimacy alone as an injury giving rights to damages. As
the court stated, "[b]eing born under one set of circumstances rather than an-
other . . . is not a suable wrong that is cognizable in court. '79 While the court
seemed to have considered only the "injury" of illegitimacy and not that of
debilitating physical impairment in rendering its decision, the
"noncognizability" language was echoed by later courts when dealing with the
latter, more difficult, cases.
B. The First "True" Wrongful Life Case
The seminal case in the development of the wrongful life tort was Gleitman
v. Cosgrove,s° decided in 1967. The case consisted of parallel claims for wrong-
ful life by an impaired infant and for wrongful birth by his parents. The defend-
ants were the physicians who had treated the infant's mother during her preg-
nancy. According to the plaintiffs, the mother had informed the defendants at
the time that she learned she was pregnant of a recent illness diagnosed as
German measles.8' The defendants had allegedly told her that this would pre-
sent no problems, and failed to warn her of the possibility of resultant defects.
After several episodes of similar inquiry and reassurance throughout the term of
the pregnancy, Mrs. Gleitman gave birth to plaintiff Jeffrey, who suffered from
substantial defects in sight, hearing, and speech as a result of his exposure as a
fetus to his mother's German measles. 8 '
Unlike his predecessors in Zepeda and Williams, the infant plaintiff in
Gleitman did not allege that the defendants' negligence had prevented him from
enjoying a normal existence. He expressly stated that the best position he could
have achieved was nonexistence, and asked for damages measuring only the dif-
ference between nonexistence and the severely impaired condition in which he
lived. The trial court dismissed the claim for failure to show proximate cause, 3
not seeing the real issue even though the plaintiff had stated it correctly. The
plaintiff did not claim that the defendants had caused his physical impairments
directly; rather, their negligent failure to provide the plaintiff's mother with the
information necessary for her decision to terminate the pregnancy had proxi-
mately caused the plaintiff's birth and existence, with its resulting suffering.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in a five-two split decision affirmed the
trial court's dismissal, but for reasons different from those stated by the trial
court. First, it found the measurement of the difference between a life impaired
by defects against "the utter void of nonexistence" to be too difficult.8 4 In addi-
tion, the court saw a logical impossibility in the plaintiff's ability to prove dam-
78. Id. at 483, 223 N.E.2d at 344, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
79. Id. at 484, 223 N.E.2d at 344, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
80. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
81. Id. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690.
82. Id. at 25, 227 A.2d at 690.
83. Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691.
84. Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
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ages due to the birth because "no comparison is possible since were it not for
the act of birth the infant would not exist. By his cause of action, the plaintiff
cuts from under himself the ground upon which he needs to rely in order to
prove his damage."8 5 The court also cited approvingly the two earlier wrongful
life cases and the policy reasons for their denials of recovery.86
Two other important rationales for the court's ruling against the plaintiff
can be found in other parts of the opinion. In denying the parents' claim for
wrongful birth, the court demonstrated an overwhelming preference for life over
nonexistence, no matter what the conditions of that life. The availability of a
legal abortion for the parents was hotly debated by the court, at least in the
nonmajority opinions. 87 However, the court was decidedly against the desirabil-
ity of allowing even a legal abortion under such circumstances, expressing a fear
of eugenics considerations overriding the "sanctity of the single human life." 88
The court also stated its preference for life in general terms, admonishing
the parents that "[a] child need not be perfect to have a worthwhile life," 8 and
that "[e]xamples of famous persons who have had great achievement despite
physical defects come readily to mind."90 The court concluded that part of be-
ing human is the pursuit of life under any terms possible and the refusal to let it
slip away.9 1
C. Post-Roe v. Wade Developments
Twelve years later, the Supreme Court of New Jersey again faced a wrong-
ful life complaint in the case of Berman v. Allan.92 The questions concerning
the legality of abortion in wrongful life contexts had been settled six years ear-
lier in 1973 with the decision of Roe v. Wade.93 While abandoning the abortion
issue and other rationales of the Gleitman court, the Berman court came up
with its own reasons to deny recovery.
The infant plaintiff in Berman had been conceived when her mother was
thirty-eight years old, an advanced age that was a significant risk factor for the
development of Down's Syndrome in the infant.94 The defendant doctor had
allegedly failed to warn the plaintiff's mother of this risk and had neglected to
inform her of a procedure called amniocentesis, which would have shown the
presence of the abnormality in the unborn child.95 As a result, the plaintiff's
mother carried her to term and the plaintiff was born with the impairment.
85. Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692 (quoting Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "'Wrongful Life", I ISRAEL L. REV.
513, 529 (1966)).
86. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692.
87. See, e.g., id. at 32-49, 227 A.2d at 694-703 (Francis, J., concurring); id. at 49-55, 227 A.2d at 704-06
(Jacobs, J., dissenting); id. at 55-63, 227 A.2d at 707-11 (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting in part).
88. Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693. For more on the impact of the abortion controversy on the wrongful life
claim, see infra notes 134-50 and accompanying text.
92. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
93. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
94. Berman, 80 N.J. at 425, 404 A.2d at 10.
95. Id.
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As in Gleitman, a majority of the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for
failure to state a valid cause of action. However, the reasoning behind the
Berman decision was different. First, the court expressly rejected two of the
bases for the Gleitman decision: difficulty in ascertaining damages and the ques-
tion of whether a legal abortion was attainable. As to the first basis, the court
expressed extreme reluctance to "deny the validity of [the infant] Sharon's
complaint solely because damages are difficult to ascertain.", 6 Rather, it stated
that, in the absence of other problems with the claim, it would be willing to
fashion at least a partial remedy. 97
The court also rejected the policy concerns of the Gleitman court over the
legal procurement of an abortion, noting in fact that public policy now favored
the wrongful life tort because parents had a right to choose for themselves and
their baby whether or not to abort an impaired fetus. 9 Instead, the court fo-
cused on what had provided the basic foundation for the abortion argument: a
"sanctity of life" rationale. After supplying references to various indirect "man-
ifestations" of the importance of life in American society, 9 the court pro-
claimed that life was always preferable to nonlife, and so the plaintiff, as a
matter of law, could not have suffered any harm or injury by being brought to
life, even in an impaired state. This rationale, in one form or another, was to
remain as one of the prevalent arguments used by later courts to reject wrongful
life claims.
D. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories and its Progeny
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories,100 decided in California in 1980,
was the first intermediate-level court decision recognizing a wrongful life cause
of action not to be reversed by the state supreme court.' 0' In Curlender, the
infant plaintiff's parents had gone to the defendant laboratories for testing to
determine if they were carriers of Tay-Sachs disease, a hereditary affliction af-
fecting mostly persons of Ashkenazi Jewish descent and "characterized by par-
tial or complete loss of vision, mental underdevelopment, softness of the mus-
cles, [and] convulsions, etc."' 2 As a result of the alleged negligence of the
laboratories, the plaintiff's parents were told that they were not carriers of the
disease, which led to their decision to carry the plaintiff to term. The plaintiff
was born afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease, however, and had an estimated life
expectancy of only four years. 103
96. Id. at 428, 404 A.2d at 12.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 431-32, 404 A.2d at 14.
99. See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
100. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
101. However, the types of damages available to a wrongful life plaintiff were considerably limited by a
subsequent case. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982). For an example of a
state supreme court decision completely reversing a lower court's recognition of a wrongful life claim, see Azzolino
v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985).
102. Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 815-16, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480, n.4 (quoting . SCHMIDT, ArrORNEWS
DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE (1980)).
103. Id. at 816. 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480-81.
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The court looked first at the rationales used by other jurisdictions in dis-
missing wrongful life claims. Finding merit in the Zepeda court's approach to
denying damages based on an injury of "illegitimate status," the court then
carefully distinguished the present case, in which actual physical injury was
involved. 104 The court then rejected Gleitman's reliance on the "impossibility of
measuring damages" rationale as a basis for denying relief and stated that pub-
lic policy considerations, such as societal interests in deterring similar negli-
gence and preventing or minimizing genetic and congenital defects, weighed
heavily in favor of recognizing the tort.'0 5 Finally, the court announced that it
was about to break with other jurisdictions and demonstrate "the understanding
that the law reflects, perhaps later than sooner, basic changes in the way society
views such matters.' ' 6
While recognizing the wrongful life claim as a traditional tort, the court
also acknowledged that "[t]he extent of recovery . . . is subject to certain limi-
tations due to the nature of the tort involved . . . [and thus] it is appropriate
...to tailor the elements of recovery.' 07 The court considered appropriate
damages to be "pain and suffering to be endured during the limited life span
available to such a child and any special pecuniary loss resulting from the im-
paired condition."'0 8 Thus, both general and special damages were to be al-
lowed. However, the court went even further in stating that punitive damages
could also be awarded if the plaintiff could prove malice, fraud, or oppression on
the defendant's part. 09
The Curlender decision was limited by the later case of Turpin v. Sor-
tini,"10 but only as to the damages awardable; the wrongful life claim continued
to be recognized. In Turpin, the negligent failure of a hearing specialist to prop-
erly diagnose an older sibling of the infant plaintiff as suffering from a genetic
disorder that made the sibling "stone deaf" led to the decision of the infant's
parents to conceive a second child, the plaintiff. The plaintiff was also born
totally deaf as a result of the illness"'I and sought both general and special
damages to compensate her for her injury.
The court followed the Curlender decision in refusing to dismiss the plain-
tiff's claim on the defendant's demurrer. However, it took a very different ap-
proach to considering the damages available to the plaintiff." 2 Rather than al-
low general, special, and even punitive damages, the court excluded recovery for
everything but the special costs of medical care, education, and training that the
plaintiff would incur during her lifetime." 3
104. Id. at 825, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
105. Id. at 825-26, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87.
106. Id. at 827, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
107. Id. at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
108. Id. at 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
109. Id. at 831-32, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
110. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
Ill. Id. at 223-24, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
112. Id. at 237, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
113. Id.
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While the logic of this approach has been criticized by other courts, 14 it
has been followed by the highest courts of two other jurisdictions. In Harbeson
v. Parke-Davis, Inc.," 5 the Supreme Court of Washington followed the reason-
ing of Curlender and Turpin by holding as a matter of Washington law that "a
child may maintain an action for wrongful life in order to recover the extraordi-
nary expenses to be incurred during the child's lifetime, as a result of the child's
congenital defect.""' 6 In reaching its decision, the court pointed out the
anomoly of allowing the parents of a defective infant to recover damages for the
extraordinary medical expenses incurred by the infant through a wrongful birth
claim, but not allowing the infant to recover those same damages in its own
right when the parents' claim had been precluded. As with Turpin, however,
only a claim for special damages was allowed. In Procanik v. Cillo,"7 the state
of New Jersey became the third jurisdiction to recognize the wrongful life cause
of action, through the same supreme court that had earlier decided both
Gleitman and Berman. Procanik concerned the claim of an impaired infant
whose parents' parallel claim for wrongful birth had been barred by the statute
of limitations, the exact situation that had concerned both the Turpin and Har-
beson courts. Agreeing with the analysis in those two cases, the court in Pro-
canik rejected the lower court's dismissal of the infant plaintiff's wrongful life
claim, at least with respect to damages for any special expenses to be incurred.
As noted by the court:
Law is more than an exercise in logic, and logical analysis, although essential to a
system of ordered justice, should not become a[n] instrument of injustice .... The
right to recover the often crushing burden of extraordinary expenses visited by an act
of medical malpractice should not depend on the "wholly fortuitous circumstances of
whether the parents are available to sue."1 ""
To date, these are the only jurisdictions in which the wrongful life tort has
been recognized.1 '9 Perhaps the approach of these courts in denying general
damages while allowing special damages can best be seen as one version of the
"partial remedy" concession to equity foreseen by the Berman court.
IV. JUDICIAL REASONS FOR REJECTING THE WRONGFUL LIFE CAUSE OF
ACTION
Courts have stated various reasons for rejecting wrongful life claims over
the past twenty-five years. Some of these have survived practically unchanged
throughout that period; others have been reshaped to fit changing circum-
stances, expressly rejected by later courts, or quietly abandoned when they lost
their "bite." Notably, it has been the "sanctity of life" arguments, whether ex-
114. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 I11. 2d 230, 512 N.E.2d 691 (1987).
115. 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
116. Id. at 479-80, 656 P.2d at 495.
117. 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984).
118. Id. at 351-52, 478 A.2d at 762 (quoting Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 238, 643 P.2d 954, 965, 182
Cal. Rptr. 337, 348 (1982)).
119. For developments in Louisiana and Indiana, where the status of the wrongful life cause of action is in
some doubt, see supra note 5.
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press or implicit, that have continued to trouble wrongful life plaintiffs in recent
cases.
A. Abandoned Arguments
1. "Opening the Floodgates"
While the court in Zepeda v. Zepeda"2 recognized that a "tortious act"
had been committed by the defendant,' 2' it found overriding policy reasons to
deny recovery to the infant plaintiff. One commentator has noted that "[t]he
Illinois court was not merely worried that entertaining [the] suit would open the
floodgates of litigation [to] the claims of the quarter million illegitimate chil-
dren born each year in the United States.' 22 While such a result would have
been a disaster of epic proportions, the potential stakes were even higher. As the
court itself stated:
What does disturb us is the nature of the new action and the related suits which would
be encouraged. Encouragement would extend to all others born into the world under
conditions they might regard as adverse. One might seek damages for being born of a
certain color, another because of race; one for being born with a hereditary disease,
another for inheriting unfortunate family characteristics; one for being born into a
large and destitute family, another because a parent has an unsavory reputation. 12
The court's concern about stimulating wrongful life suits did not stop even
with these groups, however. The court indulged in some creative extrapolation
to consider the possibility of even more wrongful life suits, such as those that
might be brought by the dissatisfied offspring of public sperm bank donees, vic-
tims of intentional genetic mutation, and newly invented (and presumably hu-
manoid) life forms.124
The "floodgates" rationale does not usually appear in later wrongful life
suits, which deal with genetic or congenital defects rather than with social or
economic status, and for several reasons. First, "there is a world of difference
between an unwanted healthy child who is illegitimate .. .and the severely
deformed infant plaintiff."" 25 Because these serious physical injuries are more
easily distinguishable from the "injuries" of the litigious masses anticipated by
the Zepeda court than was the illegitimacy suffered by the infant Zepeda, an
award of damages to the former group would be easier to distinguish with a
"bright line" test than would have an award in the Zepeda case.
More important, though, is the difference in the assertions being made in
the two types of cases. Complaints of impairment based on race, social class,
illegitimacy, or the like are premised on a "status which may or may not prove
to be a hindrance to one so born, depending on a multitude of other facts."" 6
120. 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
121. Id. at 247, 190 N.E.2d at 852.
122. Capron, Informed Decisionmaking In Genetic Counseling: A Dissent to the "'Wrongful Life" Debate, 48
IND. LJ. 581, 600 (1973).
123. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d at 260, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
124. Id. at 260-62, 190 N.E.2d at 858-59.
125. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 825, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 486 (1980).
126. Id.
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Thus, the court in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories2 " had no trouble in
allowing an infant plaintiff with Tay-Sachs disease to recover damages, while
agreeing with the Zepeda court's rejection of the illegitimacy complaint." 8 The
Curlender court concluded that:
[A] cause of action based upon impairment of status-illegitimacy contrasted with
legitimacy-should not be recognizable at law because a necessary element for the
establishment of any cause of action in tort is missing, injury, and damages conse-
quential to that injury. A child born with severe impairment, however, presents an
entirely different situation because the necessary element of injury is present." 9
The courts have also been concerned that the probable targets of the hun-
dreds of thousands of "impaired status" suits potentially flooding into the courts
will be the parents of the plaintiffs. While the courts have stressed the strong
policy reasons for preventing children born into "less than perfect" lives from
suing their own parents because of it, at least one commentator believes that the
concern is misplaced for several reasons:
Even if we assume that there is no longer intrafamilial immunity in the jurisdiction,
the simple fact remains that such suits are unlikely because the child's parents, as his
guardians or "next friends," actually instigate suit on the child's behalf, and it is un-
likely that they would, in effect, sue themselves. Yet even if the state routinely ap-
pointed special guardians for all defective children (or all children for that matter)
with instructions to bring any necessary lawsuits, such suits would be of little practical
value. Parents are already legally obliged to support their children . ... Conse-
quently, unlike a recovery against an outside party . . . a recovery against the parents
would just shift family funds (less lawyers' fees and court costs) from one pocket to
another. 3
Finally, wrongful life claims against parents are fundamentally different
from those against third parties because the former lack the negligence require-
ment of a breached legal duty.' 3' As pointed out by one commentator:
[P]arents, in choosing not to abort, have exercised their legal right to make this choice
... . [A]bsent proof of intentional disregard of their child's interests or gross negli-
gence in the exercise of their discretion, such an exercise of judgment would not sub-
ject the couple to liability .... [I]t is up to them to weigh the probabilities and risks
and to decide .... .32
At least one state has codified a special parental immunity from wrongftul life
claims, while allowing claims against third parties. 33
2. The Abortion Controversy
The abortion controversy has always been closely associated with the
wrongful life tort. If parents are prohibited by law from choosing to abort a
defective fetus, there can be no legal duty on the defendant to respect a poten-
127. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
128. Id. at 825, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
129. Id.
130. Capron, supra note 122, at 601-02.
131. Id. at 602.
132. Id.
133. CAL CiV. CODE § 43.6(a) (Deering 1988).
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tial abortion choice. Thus, the wrongful life tort depends upon the freedom of
parents to choose termination of a pregnancy, at least when it is applied to
postconception negligence. 34
The first "true" wrongful life case, Gleitman v. Cosgrove,"35 was decided in
1967, while abortion rights were still a matter of state control."36 While the
majority in Gleitman "assumed" for its discussion that "somehow or somewhere
Mrs. Gleitman could have obtained an abortion that would not have subjected
participants to criminal sanctions,"" 7 the matter was openly contested in the
separate opinions."38 Even the majority opinion referred to the abortion issue
again when discussing the wrongful birth claim of the parents, but only to say
that the rationale it had used to evaluate the claim resulted in no need to con-
sider "whether the abortion which plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to ob-
tain would have been illegal."" a9 The majority's sentiments concerning the rela-
tive weights it put on the state's interest in preserving life and the parents' right
to choose even legal abortions became clear, however, when it held that any
damages resulting from a violation of the parents' right "would be precluded by
the countervailing public policy supporting the preciousness of life."' 4 °
In 1973, the decision in Roe v. Wade 4' "placed abortions decisions during
the first trimester of pregnancy within the constitutional right of privacy derived
from the fifth and fourteenth amendments."' 4' With the parental right to abor-
tion and its corresponding imposition of a legal duty on third parties to respect
that right now constitutionally entrenched, the courts retreated from anti-abor-
tion arguments to the broader "sanctity of life" arguments that had been the
primary concern all along.14
For instance, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Berman v. Allan"'4 ac-
knowledged that its decision in Gleitman twelve years earlier had been based in
part on the conclusions "that 'substantial [public] policy reasons' precluded the
judicial allowance of tort damages 'for the denial of the opportunity to take an
embryonic life.' ,u"s The court then went on to reject outright the anti-abortion
ground of Gleitman:
In light of changes in the law which have occurred in the 12 years since Gleitman
was decided, the second ground relied upon by the Gleitman majority can no longer
stand in the way of judicial recognition of a cause of action founded upon wrongful
birth. The Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade. . .clearly establishes that a wo-
man possesses a constitutional right to decide whether her fetus should be aborted, at
134. Even if abortion becomes illegal, claims for wrongful life could still be recognized for negligent acts or
omissions of the defendant that led to the wrongful conception of the child.
135. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
136. Rogers. supra note 28, at 722-23.
137. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 27, 227 A.2d at 691.
138. See supra note 87.
139. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693.
140. Id. There is a natural dovetailing of the anti-abortion and "sanctity of life" arguments. For a discussion
of the latter, see infra notes 174-86 and accompanying text.
141. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
142. Rogers, supra note 28. at 723.
143. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A,2d 8 (1979).
144. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
145. Id. at 431, 404 A.2d at 14.
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least during the first trimester of pregnancy. Public policy now supports, rather than
militates against, the proposition that she not be impermissibly denied a meaningful
opportunity to make that decision.146
For the most part,147 courts in more recent cases have also acknowledged
that the anti-abortion argument is no longer valid against wrongful life plain-
tiffs. 14 8 While at least one court deemed the Roe decision "to be of considerable
importance in defining the parameters of 'wrongful-life' litigation,' '1 49 accept-
ance of Roe by other courts has been tacit, as they invoke broader-based "sanc-
tity of life" arguments for rejecting wrongful life claims. 50
3. Difficulties with Damages
The courts have had significant problems when considering the issue of
damages in wrongful life suits. These problems basically exist on two levels:
first, the great difficulty courts face in ascertaining and measuring what dam-
ages are due the defective plaintiff; and second, the bigger question of whether
any damages can logically and legally have been suffered at all by the plaintiff
because of his birth-in other words, another manifestation of the "sanctity of
life" argument.15 '
The first problem-ascertaining and measuring damages-was originally
brought up in Gleitman v. Cosgrove. 52 The majority in that case pointed out
that the normal measurement of tort damages, with the ultimate goal of com-
pensating the plaintiff for his injuries, consists of "comparing the condition
plaintiff would have been in, had the defendants not been negligent, with plain-
tiff's impaired condition as a result of the negligence."'153 Because that condi-
tion, barring the negligence, would have been nonexistence through the termina-
tion of the pregnancy, the court reasoned that the plaintiff was in effect asking
the court to "measure the difference between his life with defects against the
utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such a
determination.' 54
146. Id. at 431-32, 404 A.2d at 14.
147. For an interesting exception, see Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 II1. 2d 230, 512 N.E.2d 691
(1987).
148. See. e.g., Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
149. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 820, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 483 (1980).
150. The broad precedent set by Roe v. Wade appears to be in some danger at the moment. In the recently
decided case of Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), the Supreme Court found a
Missouri statute banning the use of state employees and facilities for the performance of nontherapeutic abortions
to be constitutional. In addition, three other "test" cases are currently before the Court: Hodgson v. Minnesota,
853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989); Akron Center for Reproductive
Health v. Rosen, 633 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ohio 1986), off d sub noma. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v.
Slaby, 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988), appealfiled sub noma. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 57
U.S.L.W. 3378 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1988) (No. 88-805); Turnock v. Ragsdale, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir.), appealfiled,
57 U.S.L.W. 3378 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1988) (No. 88-790). For a decidedly pro-choice discussion of these cases and
the threat that they pose to Roe v. Wade, see Johnsen & Wilder, Will Roe v. Wade Survive the Rehnquist Court,
13 NOVA L. REV. 457 (1988-89).
151. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
152. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).




The "impossibility" of the Gleitman court has been analyzed as a "mixture
of conceptual, legal, and normative or policy reasons"155 which included, among
other things, the difficulties of damages assessment. 156 By holding that the com-
parative valuation of nonexistence and impaired existence is beyond the experi-
ence and abilities of juries, the court concluded as a matter of law that no
damages could be awarded.'
This rationale for rejecting the wrongful life claim has been justifiably at-
tacked on several fronts. First, critics have questioned the basic assertion that
damages in a wrongful life suit are somehow not ascertainable by pointing out
that the problems of measurement in wrongful life claims are not all that differ-
ent from those found in other cases involving intangible injuries, in which the
value of extinguished lives, pain and suffering, and mental anguish has been
readily ascertained and measured."' As one commentator suggests:
[J]urors can never actually experience a plaintiff's life in its "normal" state before an
injury or in the injured state that resulted from a defendant's actions. An imaginative
leap is always required; the more severe the injury the greater the leap . . . . There
may be some situations in which common understanding would lead to the conclusion
that it would be better. . . never to have existed . . . and it is for the finder of fact to
determine just how much better it would be. 59
A final policy consideration in the awarding of damages is its deterrent
effect on inappropriate behavior:
The actual conduct of genetic screening, as such, is not regulated either by state
or federal statutes. And the only general statutory provisions that have a significant
impact on the screening process are those that restrict the practice of medicine to
physicians and persons under their direct supervision . . . .Aside from these ...
forms of statutory control, it is the common law-judge-made law rather than legisla-
tor-made law-that will act as a regulator of the genetic screener, at least until more
specific legislative regulatory schemes are devised.' 60
The difficulties created by a lack of clear standards for acceptable behavior
could leave practitioners ambivalent about judicial findings of no liability; while
they can breathe more easily with respect to immediate tort liability, "they may
regret the lack of an opportunity to impose a legal duty on physicians to engage
in genetic counseling and the performance of easily administered and inexpen-
sive tests on the couple and the fetus."''
The courts in both Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.'62 and Turpin v. Sor-
tini'163 recognized the strong public policy reasons supporting court recognition
of the wrongful life claim. As noted by the Harbeson court, "the policies which
155, Steinbock, The Logical Case for "Wrongful Life," 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1986, at 15, 17.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Steinbock, supra note 155.
159. Capron, supra note 122, at 658-59.
160. Waltz, The Liability of Physicians and Associated Personnel for Malpractice in Genetic Screening, in
GENETICS AND THE LAW 139, 140 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976).
161. Curran, Tay-Sachs Disease, Wrongful Life, and Preventive Malpractice, 67 AM. . PUB. HEALTH
568, 568 (1977),
162. 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
163. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
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persuaded us . . to recognize parents' claims of wrongful birth apply equally
to recognition of claims of wrongful life. Imposition of a corresponding duty to
the child will similarly foster the societal objectives of genetic counseling and
prenatal testing, and will discourage malpractice."' 64 While the burden imposed
on a negligent party might seem unduly harsh, one commentator has stated that
the means of avoiding liability in the first place is readily available:
It is the disclosure of information, including the substantial areas of uncertainty,
which provides a shield against liability. The practitioner who has not kept up with
developments and still holds himself out as a genetic counselor is subject to the same
risk of liability as any other medical practitioner in any field who falls short. 115
Also troublesome in the Gleitman decision is what Justice Jacobs in his
dissent to that case pointed out was the permitting of "a wrong with serious
consequential injury to go wholly unredressed."' 16 He stated that he could find
"no sulstantial basis for the majority's notion that it would be 'impossible'...
to deal properly with the matter of compensatory damages . . . . Indeed, even if
there were more evaluation complexities than are truly present . . . they would
not furnish any sound basis for the total denial of recovery. '167
This equitable component of ascertaining damages has been expressed by
the Supreme Court in Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper
Co.:
168
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the
amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles
of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer
from making any amend for his acts. 6 9
The court in Berman v. Allan17 0 stated its reluctance to follow Gleitman in
denying recovery to a wrongful life plaintiff "solely because damages are diffi-
cult to ascertain. 1' 7 ' It went on, however, to state that it too was denying an
award to the plaintiff, not because damages existed that were unascertainable,
but because the plaintiff had suffered no damages cognizable at law."' The
Berman court thus stripped the "measurement of damages" argument down to
its essence: a "sanctity of life" argument and a resulting preference for life, in
any state, over nonlife."'
164. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 481, 656 P.2d at 496.
165. Furrow, Impaired Children and Tort Remedies: The Emergence of a Consensus, 11 LAW. MED. &
HEALTH CARE 148, 151 (1983).
166. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 49, 227 A.2d 689, 703 (1967) (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 50, 227 A.2d at 704.
168. 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
169. Id. at 563.
170. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
171. Id. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12.




B. "Sanctity of Life" Arguments
1. A Nonrebuttable Presumption
As noted earlier, most of the rationales used by courts to reject wrongful
life claims have been variations or extensions of a basic "sanctity of life" argu-
ment. As the court in Phillips v. United States'1 4 recognized:
Although these arguments are phrased in varying terminology-the "impossibility" of
determining damages based on a comparison of defective existence with nonexistence,
...the absence of recognized damages, . . . the metaphysical, theological, or philo-
sophical nature of the issues, . . the lack of a "justiciable" issue, . . . or the absence
of a legally "cognizable" cause of action, .... -they essentially focus on the
"preciousness of human life."' 5
While the main points of these arguments-that human life is precious and
that our society benefits from a universal high regard for that life-are per-
fectly valid, proponents of the argument have refused to acknowledge those
rare, but very real, conditions under which a rational person might reasonably
choose nonexistence. By foreclosing even the possibility of such a position, the
argument forces its nonrebuttable presumption on everyone, taking away any
freedom to make individual life choices under sometimes difficult circumstances.
The first wrongful life case in which this usurpation occurred was Gleitman
v. Cosgrove."76 While the court used veiled versions of the argument to dismiss
the infant plaintiff's wrongful life suit, it stated the argument outright as a basis
for rejecting a wrongful birth suit by the infant's parents:
It is basic to the human condition to seek life and hold on to it however heavily
burdened. If Jeffrey could have been asked as to whether his life should be snuffed out
before his full term of gestation could run its course, our felt intuition of human na-
ture tells us he would almost surely choose life with defects as against no life at all. 177
Thus, the court used its "felt intuition" to determine, as a matter of law, that
other reasonable persons could not find otherwise. This proposition seems un-
likely, given the fact that three of the seven justices dissented from some aspect
of the majority's opinion in the case.""
The court in Berman v. Allan17 9 arrived at the same conclusion, but by a
slightly different route. Starting off with the assertion that "[o]ne of the most
deeply held beliefs of our society is that life-whether experienced with or with-
out a major physical handicap-is more precious than non-life," 8 0 the court
then proceeded to gather "concrete manifestations"'' of its belief. These mani-
festations included, among other things, "references to the sanctity of life"' 8 in
such documents as the federal and state constitutions and the Declaration of
174. 508 F. Supp. 537 (1980).
175. Id. at 543.
176. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
177. Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
178. However, only two judges, Jacobs and Schettino, dissented from the dismissal of the wrongful life claim.
179. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
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Independence; the fact that "the most severe criminal penalties [are reserved]
for individuals who have unjustifiably deprived others of life";1 83 and the "high
esteem which our society accords to those involved in the medical profession
• . . [because] [p]hysicians are the preservers of life."' 84
The Berman court concluded by extending its sympathy to the infant plain-
tiff but simultaneously stated that "[w]e cannot, however, say that she would
have been better off had she never been brought into the world."' 85 The court
thus appears to have misunderstood its role; reversing the dismissal of plaintiff's
cause of action would not necessarily have shown agreement with the plaintiff's
ultimate assertion, but merely would have acknowledged that the matter was
one on which reasonable persons could disagree, and thus should be decided by
the trier of fact. Once again, however, the court (less one dissenting voice)"8 6
foreclosed that possibility.
2. A Better Approach: A Rebuttable Presumption
Similar judicial resistance to the notion that a person could reasonably pre-
fer nonexistence to an impaired existence in some circumstances has been found
in so-called "right to die" cases. 187 A real danger existed that seriously ill indi-
viduals who wished to exercise their private choice not to continue an existence
that they found to be painful and intolerable, but who were at the mercy of the
courts in the exercise of their choice because of physical incapacity or some
other reason, would be forced to endure existence because of the court's strong
preference for continued life. However, as pointed out by one commentator,
these "[o]ther types of cases involving existence-versus-nonexistence policy con-
siderations have not adopted the irrebuttable presumption espoused in 'wrongful
life' decisions that life is always preferred over nonexistence."'' l8 Rather, there
has developed a rebuttable presumption that life is preferable, with the burden
then on the plaintiff to show otherwise. Once the courts have allowed for at
least the possibility that nonexistence can be shown in a given circumstance to
be preferable over existence, plaintiffs who have valid positions have been per-
mitted to demonstrate them.
For instance, the court in Bouvia v. Superior Court,'8" in ordering the re-
moval of a nasogastric feeding tube from a competent cerebral palsy victim at
her request (even though it would lead to her death by starvation), stated its
agreement with the plaintiff that it was error to attach "undue importance to
the amount of time possibly available" rather than "to give equal weight and
consideration for the quality of that life; an equal, if not more significant, con-
183. Id.
184. Id. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13.
185. Id.
186. Judge Handler provided the only dissent concerning the wrongful life claim, although the court was
more evenly divided on the issue of the parents' wrongful birth claim.
187. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
188. Comment, supra note 33, at 495.
189. 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986).
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sideration."' 90 The court also paid deference to the plaintiff's personal and rea-
sonable determination that
the quality of her life has been diminished to the point of hopelessness, uselessness,
unenjoyability, and frustration . . . If her right to choose may not be exercised be-
cause there remains to her, in the opinion of a court, . . . a certain arbitrary number
of years, . . . her right will have lost its value and meaning. 191
Finally, the court concluded by noting that "[i]t is incongruous, if not mon-
strous, . . . to assert [the] right to preserve a life that someone else must live,
or, more accurately, endure. . . .We cannot conceive it to be the policy of this
state to inflict such an ordeal upon anyone." '92
Cases such as Bouvia have demonstrated that, at least in some situations,
courts are willing to acknowledge the possibility that nonexistence might rea-
sonably be preferable for some over a seriously impaired life.'93 This is an im-
portant first step for wrongful life claims, where the court's open-mindedness
would result in at least a "day in court" for the plaintiff, rather than a preclu-
sion of that possibility as a matter of law. Plaintiffs who have suffered the worst
injuries would thus be allowed to distinguish their special circumstances, as well
as the special claim that they assert.
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
It must first be recognized that while the courts have erred in their ratio-
nales for rejecting wrongful life claims, many of these claims were nevertheless
properly quashed. It is only in a small number of cases, when the impairment
was so severe that the burden of life might truly have exceeded its benefit, that
rejection of the claims has been wrong. These plaintiffs never had their "day in
court," a chance to show how their plight is different from that of the rest.
Various solutions have been proposed in order to overcome the courts' con-
tinuing hostility toward the wrongful life cause of action.194 One commonly pro-
posed solution would take the claim of a wrongful life plaintiff on its face, but
would then require the plaintiff to prove the "net burden" of his life. As will be
seen, while this solution is logically and legally consistent, it is also somewhat
unsatisfying emotionally. Perhaps that is the only possible result, given the
tragic context of these claims.
A. Showing a Valid Cause of Action
To avoid early dismissal for failure to state a valid cause of action, a
wrongful life plaintiff would first have to show the traditional negligence ele-
ments, starting with a duty from the defendant to the plaintiff, either direct or
"derivative," and a breach of that duty. The plaintiff would also have to show
190. Id. at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
191. Id. at 1142-43, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304-05.
192. Id. at 1143-44, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
193. Note, supra note 25, at 223-24.
194. See, e.g., Morreim, The Concept of Harm Reconceived: A Different Look at Wrongful Life, 7 LAW &
PHIL 3 (1988-89) (call for a new and broader definition of "harm").
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the element of causation; that is, that absent the negligence of the defendant,
the plaintiff's parents would have chosen either not to conceive the plaintiff or to
terminate the pregnancy. To satisfy this requirement, courts might either im-
pose a "reasonable person" standard or demand convincing evidence of what the
parents would have chosen.
Up to this point, the proposed solution is similar to that currently used by
most courts. A key difference in the proposed scheme, however, would be a
change in the presumption of the court as to what constitutes a legal "injury."
Rather than a nonrebuttable presumption that no possible condition of life
could be worse than nonexistence, and thus, that no injury could have been
suffered by the plaintiff, the court would adopt a rebuttable presumption of
preference for life. This presumption would be similar to that used in "right to
die" cases and would allow the plaintiff to present the particulars of his claim
before the trier of fact.
A mathematical scheme has been developed that helps illustrate the change
in focus.195 Under the nonrebuttable presumption in favor of life used by most
courts, nonexistence is given a negative value, life without defects is given a
high positive value, and life impaired by defects is given a lower, but still posi-
tive, number. A comparison of the values reveals that nonexistence can thus
never be ranked higher than any state of life, even that which is most impaired.
This result seems counterintuitive, especially in the contexts of "right to die"
cases and the most severe wrongful life cases. That is, these cases involve condi-
tions under which nonexistence could perhaps reasonably be preferred.' 96
The proposed scheme would have a different assignment system. Nonexis-
tence would be valued at zero, while life without defects would retain its high
positive value. Life impaired with defects would be assigned values in a range
spanning from positive numbers just below that assigned to life without defects,
down to negative values for the most serious of impairments. While most im-
paired conditions would still fall above nonexistence in value and thus result in
no real injury, others that were the most severe and tragic, symbolized by nega-
tive numbers, would fall below the value of nonexistence and would thus be
classified as an injury.
To avoid the "open floodgates" possibility that the Zepeda court feared so
much, the injury alleged would have to be a physical one, such as genetic or
congenital impairment, and not merely an "impaired status" injury such a ille-
gitimacy. This distinction of the Curlender court seems valid, considering the
195. Note, supra note 46, at 64-66. It is important to keep in mind that the mathematical values used in this
scheme are not to be used in actual calculation of damages. The only significance of the values is in their relation-
ships to others, for mere ease of conceptualization.
196. Joel Feinberg, a leading commentator on the issue of harm, has formulated a hypothetical to demon-
strate how such an analysis might be carried out:
Suppose that after the death of your body a deity appears to you and . . . proposes to you an option. You
can be born again after death (reincarnated), but only as a Tay-Sachs baby with a painful life expectancy
of four years to be followed by a permanent extinction, or you can opt for permanent extinction to begin
immediately. I should think you would have to be crazy to select the first option.
Feinberg, Wrongful Life and the Conterfactual Element in Harming, 4 Soc. PHIL & POL'Y 145, 164 (1989),
quoted in Peters, Protecting the Unconceived: Nonexistence, Avoidability, and Reproductive Technology, 31
ARIz. L. REV. 487, 499 (1989).
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more ephemeral nature of "status" impairments and the likelihood that they
can be reversed. In contrast, the physical injuries resulting from severe defects
are likely to remain throughout the plaintiff's life.
B. Showing Damages
The wrongful life plaintiff must then show a trier of fact that his life was
truly wrongful to him-that is, the burdens of his life outweigh the benefits he
has received. This formula approach derives from the "benefit rule" doctrine of
tort law, which states that "when the defendant's tortious conduct has caused
harm to the plaintiff. . . and . . . has conferred a special benefit to the interest
of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit that was conferred is
considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable."' 97 As
has been pointed out, juries are frequently called upon to measure damages for
intangible injuries such as wrongful death, pain and suffering, and loss of con-
sortium. The same measuring would take place in the wrongful life context.
The trier of fact would first measure the amount of burden that the impair-
ment has inflicted on the plaintiff. Next, the same measurement would be made
of the benefits that the plaintiff could expect to derive from his existence, de-
spite the impairment. The difference in these two values, assuming that the bur-
dens outweighed the benefits, would be the general damages recoverable by the
plaintiff. If the result of the comparison was a net benefit, the plaintiff would
collect nothing under the theory that overall, he has suffered no injury by being
born. Thus, general damages such as pain and suffering would be available
under this proposed scheme, exactly as they would be in other tort actions. Spe-
cial damages for medical expenses, education, and training would also be avail-
able under the usual rules for compensation.
C. Effects on Plaintiffs
This scheme would reward some plaintiffs who are currently ignored by the
courts while reducing or eliminating the awards of other plaintiffs who have
received limited special damages in certain jurisdictions.
The "status-impaired" plaintiff would still be unable to state a valid cause
of action and thus would be denied recovery. The plaintiff who is only slightly
impaired and who expects a reasonably normal and functional life would also
not recover; most, if not all, reasonable persons would agree that the net bal-
ance of such a life would be in favor of the benefits derived. This plaintiff would
receive neither general nor special damages, because the acts of the defendant
did not inflict a real injury. This result goes against the approach of the three
jurisdictions that currently recognize a limited cause of action for wrongful life,
but seems to be a truer judgment of the plaintiff's asserted wrongful life claim.
On the other hand, certain plaintiffs who have suffered the most severe
impairments, such as Tay-Sachs disease or polycystic kidney disease, which pre-
sent the prospect of only a limited lifespan filled with intense pain and suffering,
197. Rogers, supra note 28, at 739 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977)).
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could recover damages under the proposed system. These plaintiffs, who are in
the best position to demonstrate that their lives have been a "net burden" to
them, should be able to recover for general and special damages. Ironically,
however, the tragic state in which these plaintiffs exist often makes the damage
awards largely useless to them. Nothing can soften the pain of those still suffer-
ing; others have already died from their acquired afflictions. Other purposes will
have been served, however, not the least of which will be a deterrent effect on
other negligent practitioners.
VI. CONCLUSION
Court analysis of wrongful life claims has been an area of constant change,
where public policies and societal views have often changed more quickly than
the law. Recognition of the sanctity of human life is the cornerstone of civiliza-
tion and thus should not be minimized. However, advances in technology have
led to some circumstances in which tragedies formerly suffered silently can now
be avoided through pre- and postconception testing, the deliberate choice of po-
tential parents not to conceive, or the termination of an impaired fetus. Love
and respect for life should not prevent the doing of whatever is possible to en-
sure that life remains worth living.
The courts have begun with a love of life, but have turned it into a
nonrebuttable presumption forced on anyone who would express an individual
preference for something other than continued existence and suffering. While
this attitude of the courts has softened somewhat in "right to die" cases, it
remains firm in other areas. As noted by Justice Flaherty in Speck v. Fine-
gold,198 such an attitude can inadvertently lead to harsh results:
Those holding such views are apparently able to overlook what is plain to see: that-in
cases such as this-a diseased plaintiff exists and, taking the allegations of the com-
plaint as true, would not exist at all but for the negligence of the defendants. Existence
in itself can hardly be characterized as an injury, but when existence is foreseeably
and inextricably coupled with a disease, such an existence, depending upon the nature
of the disease, may be intolerably burdensome. To judicially foreclose consideration of
whether life in a particular case is such a burden would be to tell the diseased, possi-
bly deformed plaintiff that he can seek no remedy in the courts and to imply that his
alternative remedy, in the extreme event that he finds his life unduly burdensome, is
suicide. No court in the land would directly send such a message to these plaintiffs.
We deem it unfortunate that some courts have indeed sent that message by
implication. 199
A step in the right direction would be a softening of the presumption that life is
always preferable to nonexistence in wrongful life cases. By allowing the most
severely impaired plaintiffs to have their "day in court," the best interests of all
would be better served.
Timothy J. Dawe
198. 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981).
199. Id. at 87, 439 A.2d at 115.
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